Alvis Duncan Hicks in the Civil War

Garry D. Nation.

2009,  All rights reserved.

***

Chapter III

Camp Wildcat

First Fire

October 21, 1861

         Artist’s depiction of defense of Hoosier Knob at Camp Wildcat

It is fitting that the first test for the fighting Tennesseans from Roane County would come from the man whose name they had already come to loathe: Felix Zollicoffer.  In their eagerness to get to that fight, however, they had no idea how close they came to losing their own new and popular commander—as a casualty of politics.

George Thomas was aware of the White House concern for East Tennessee, and of the president’s intense interest that the territory be taken back as soon as possible.  Even before he left Washington Thomas personally urged Winfield Scott, still General-in-Chief of the Army, to authorize him to stage an invasion through the Cumberland Gap.  After he arrived at Camp Dick Robinson and saw how much of the growing force was composed of East Tennessee loyalists, he was all the more determined to carry out an offensive operation along that line.  He immediately began planning such an operation, such as he could while working to organize his camp without a staff. 

The volunteers at Camp Robinson felt powerful because of their numbers, and were impatient to march home as a liberating army.  Thomas wanted to make that happen, but he also understood that this force was woefully unprepared for combat, both in training and in materiel. Enduring the grumbling of his restive volunteers, he set about in his methodical way to remedy both of those problems, with a view toward a movement on the Cumberland Gap before year’s end.  He was making headway too.  The men in the camp were beginning to look like soldiers, he had acquired a new regiment of cavalry composed of Kentucky volunteers, and a small battery of artillery arrived from Ohio.

Thomas’s plans, however, were stalled before they could even get started, caught in a pincer between the immediate issues of his volunteer brigade and the fuzzy, indecisive, contradictory, politically motivated thinking of his superiors.

Thomas had scarcely begun his preparations when on October 10 Andrew Johnson arrived to tour the camp.  During his visit Johnson also delivered to Thomas a letter from Brigadier General O. M. Mitchel, the new commander of the newly created Department of the Ohio.  The message stunned and perplexed Thomas.  It informed him that the Secretary of War had ordered Mitchel to take command of the troops at Camp Robinson and prepare for a forward movement to the Cumberland Gap and from there into East Tennessee—what Thomas was already preparing to do.

At this time there was no settled plan or strategy for the western theater of the war, but there was in the White House a strong sense of urgency to invade and liberate East Tennessee.  Especially in this early phase of the war, one hand in the Lincoln administration did not always know what the other hand was doing.  It seems that Mitchel, a West Point graduate who had been out of the army for years, was ambitious for quick promotion and had lobbied Simon Cameron vigorously for the appointment to lead the invasion. Cameron was one of many in Washington who never fully approved of the Virginian Thomas’s elevation to command and may have been looking for a way to nullify it.  Or he may simply have been unaware of all Thomas was doing.  He certainly was perturbed that no move had yet been made to re-take East Tennessee.

Thomas was furious when he read Mitchel’s letter.  Stung by what he regarded as both an undeserved demotion and a personal rebuke, he immediately fired back a respctful but terse response to Mitchel, dated October 11:

I have been doing all in my power to prepare the troops for a move on Cumberland Ford, and to seize the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, and shall continue to do all I can to assist you until your arrival here; but justice to myself requires that I ask to be relieved from duty with these troops, since the Secretary of War thought it necessary to supersede me in command without, as I conceive, any just cause for so doing.

At the same time he also wrote to Sherman, his direct superior who had taken over command of the Department of the Cumberland from Anderson:

I received an official communication to-day [sic] from Brigadier General O. M. Mitchel, informing me that he had been ordered by the Secretary of War to repair to this camp and prepare the troops for a forward movement…. As I have been doing all in my power to effect this very thing, to have the execution of it taken from me when nearly prepared to take the field, is extremely mortifying.  I have therefore respectfully to ask to be relieved from duty with the troops on the arrival of General Mitchel.

Sherman, being no doubt as surprised and dismayed as Thomas but also subject to fluctuating and uncertain orders himself, wrote back to reassure his former classmate:

You are authorized to go on and prepare your command for active service. General Mitchel is subject to my orders, and I will, if possible, give you the opportunity to complete what you have begun. Of course I would do all I can to carry out your wishes, but feel that the affairs of Kentucky call for the united action of all engaged.

Believing now that Sherman would back him up, Thomas withdrew his request to be relieved and continued to train his men and try to get them properly equipped.  Alvis Hicks and his comrades in the 2nd Tennessee probably never knew about any of these intrigues, but only that the pace of their drilling had been stepped up.  Meanwhile the Confederates in Tennessee would not be content to wait for Thomas to invade their territory.  They were determined to strike first.

***

The first major campaign in the Western theater of war would be the battle over Kentucky.  Both sides were determined to keep that state.  A 500-mile border separated it from Tennessee.  By fall the Federals had the advantage of an organized military presence in the state, in significant part through the volunteers from Kentucky and Tennessee.  The Confederates, however, had the advantage of a unified command of this entire front under one outstanding soldier: Albert Sidney Johnston, regarded at this time by both sides as the best general in either army (except for Pierre G. T. Beauregard, who considered himself the best general in either army).

Johnston knew that he was outnumbered on the long front 2 to 1.  But he also knew that the Union command was divided, and he determined to exploit that situation through initiative and deception.  He first embarked on a shrewd but risky campaign of psychological warfare—including threatening moves, tactical raids, propaganda, and misinformation.  He made deliberate overstatements of troop strength, and boldly indicated that a massive offensive was in the works.  These statements were printed in Southern papers, repeated in the North, and recorded as facts in reports passed among the Federal high command. (Of course Johnston also thereby raised unrealistic expectations of the Southern populace, who became convinced that early victory was at hand.)

Johnston’s strategy apparently worked like a charm on Sherman first of all.  “I am convinced from many facts,” he wrote to George McClellan in Washington, “that A. Sidney Johnston is making herculean efforts to strike a great blow in Kentucky; that he designs to move from Bowling Green on Lexington, Louisville, and Cincinnati.”  Why Johnston never made that massive attack was a mystery to Sherman—apparently to his dying day, for he was still perplexed years later when he wrote his memoir.  The Confederate general’s mind games help us better understand why Sherman decided he needed 200,000 men to gain victory in the West—in turn prompting the Northern papers to conclude that for all his brilliance, Sherman had gone mad.

One of the instruments Johnston used to convince Sherman of this design was his aggressive brigadier, 49 year-old Felix Kirk Zollicoffer.

Zollicoffer (a native Tennessean, despite his European-sounding name) was not a professional soldier, and his appointment as a general was admittedly political.  A Nashville newspaper editor famous for his fiery editorials, he was also a Tennessee state politician. He had served 3 terms in the U. S. House of Representatives.  Surprisingly he had not been an advocate for Secession, had actually campaigned for Constitutional Unionist John Bell, and had been a delegate to the 1861 Washington Peace Conference.  He was, however, a devout believer in states’ rights, and when Tennessee seceded he determined to fight for his home state.
Some 20 years earlier he had served briefly as a lieutenant in the Second Seminole War, so he was not devoid of military experience, but even he did not think that was enough to qualify him for high command.  He declined Gov. Isham Harris’s offer of a generalship over state forces, but Harris was insistent and he finally

Brig. General Felix Zollicoffer

accepted.

The first task was to secure the “rebellious” Eastern region.  Under Harris’s orders and with 4,000 men Zollicoffer established a stronghold in Knoxville, and from thence began to seal the Cumberland Gap and other routes along the border between East Tennessee and Kentucky.  It was Zollicoffer’s troops that the men from Roane County had to dodge in order to make it to Camp Dick Robinson.

Soon he was made a general officer in the CSA and put under Johnston’s command.  Though keenly aware of Zollicoffer’s inexperience, Johnston liked his initiative and aggressiveness.  He decided to use that, and directed Zollicoffer to probe the Union’s soft underbelly in the Cumberland area and see how far he could go.   On the left he had Leonidas Polk facing off Grant near Columbus, and in the center Simon Bolivar Buckner penetrating as far as Bowling Green.  By late September Johnston had established a line from which he could threaten the entire Federal hold on Kentucky.  Still, his line was alarmingly thin, and he needed to strike before the Union generals figured out how thin it was.

***

The key to eastern Kentucky was control of the Wilderness Road from the Cumberland Gap to Boonesboro.1  While the argument was still going on between the Union high command as to whether and how to invade Tennessee, Johnston determined to seize control of that artery.  By doing so he would thus gain control of the entire Bluegrass region, acquire access to the Ohio River, and establish a stranglehold on the most vigorously pro-Union area in the South  From that position Zollicoffer could threaten both Camp Dick Robinson and the Kentucky state capital..


Zollicoffer had already created much havoc in his zone.  On September 9 he moved his brigade, 5400 strong, through the Cumberland Gap into Kentucky.  Over the next several days his men took possession of the Cumberland Ford at Pineville, scattered two raw volunteer regiments, and easily defeated a contingent of Home Guards from Barbourville.   His confidence was strong and his men’s morale was high—they called him “Pappy Zolly,” “Pap” for short.

On September 23 General Thomas dispatched Colonel Theophilous Garrard from Camp Dick Robinson with his 7th Kentucky Volunteers to Wildcat Mountain (also called Rockcastle Heights and London Heights) to block Zollicoffer’s progress.  Garrard, like Samuel Carter, had been recruiting his own regiment from scratch.  He now had almost 1,000 men, but they were little more than warm bodies, not yet trained and still poorly equipped.  They were accompanied by the 1st Kentucky Cavalry under Col. Frank Wolford, another green unit that had barely begun its training.

Garrard chose an excellent position, a natural rock fortress on a ridge 3 miles above the Rockcastle River at a fork in the road.  He immediately set his men toward building extended fortifications, trenches, rifle pits, and obstacles.  This was Camp Wildcat.  One writer describes the terrain:

Moving South West along the mountain, the area becomes much steeper and gradually turns into Infantry Ridge, a rocky spot, dense in vegetation, where Garrard was positioned. South East of the Headquarters is the steepest point of Wildcat Mountain, a place known [since the day of battle] as Hoosier Knob, littered with all forms of defense: abatis, rocks, trees, fallen and standing. Here was Wolford's HQ. Moving North West of Camp Wildcat HQ Wilderness Road turns into Winding Blade's Road, where the trees and darkness are thicker than anywhere before. Farther North East is Backeye Ridge.2

On September 29 Garrard reported to his superiors that Zollicoffer was drawing alarmingly close, and pleaded for equipment and reinforcements.  He continued sending desperate messages, and the closer Zollicoffer came, the more frantic were Garrard’s dispatches.  He worried that his superiors had put him in a no-win situation.  “If I do not receive more troops [I intend] to abandon this place,” he insisted.  “I have no idea of having my men butchered up here where they have a force of six to one… I would like to hear from you immediately.”

Aggravating Garrard’s problems was a cold front that moved through.  The pleasant, Indian Summer weather of early October gave way to a heavy, chilling rain, and his men did not have sufficient coats and blankets.  Hundreds became ill, and sickness reduced his already outnumbered force to 600.

One thing that saved Garrard was that the Rebel force had no supply line, had to live off the land, and was making slow progress as a result.  Zollicoffer wrote, “The country is so poor we had exhausted the forage on the road for 15 miles back in twenty-four hours.”  Even so, by October 17 Zollicoffer’s main force was at the Laurel River, in two more days he was only four miles from Camp Wildcat, and Garrard was trying to decide whether to risk court martial by pulling back without orders.  Thomas could wait no longer to move.

Thomas’s decision was complicated by the fact that he had no one to send who was fully trained and prepared for battle.  He waited as long as he could to pull the trigger.

Until now he did not even have a senior officer ready for battlefield command.  That changed, however, on October 19 with the arrival of former Austrian officer Albin Schoepf, newly appointed as brigadier general of the U. S. Army.  Thomas immediately assigned him the readiest of his regiments, a beefed-up brigade of 7,000 including artillery, and ordered him to take command of Camp Wildcat leading.  He was directed to “make all haste.”

***

Schoepf divided his force into two columns.  The main
column, comprising the 33rd Indiana Infantry, 17th Ohio Infantry, 14th Ohio Infantry, and a battery from the 1st Ohio Light Artillery, were already at Camp Coburn, an advanced position at Crab Orchard almost twenty miles south of Camp Dick Robinson.  These state-supported units were better equipped and had been training a little longer.  They would directly reinforce the green volunteers at Camp Wildcat from the north down the Wilderness Road, and meet the enemy’s advance head-on.
The 1st and 2nd Tennessee (commanded by Col. Robert Byrd and Col. James Carter respectively), followed by the 38th Ohio Infantry, made up the second column marching out from

Brig. General

Albin Schoepf

Camp Robinson.  They would have an extra day’s march, but there was no point in sending all the units out at the same time from the same place anyway.  The roads were too narrow and difficult for the entire brigade to depart at once.   The rear column would not get there any faster.

Schoepf appears to have set out with the objective, not merely to turn back the Rebel attack, but to defeat and destroy Zollicoffer’s brigade in one stroke.  If he could do that, then Johnston’s entire right would also be exposed, and the way would be open to Knoxville and East Tennessee.  Despite the fact that his army was not fully ready, it was in Thomas’s mind first to stop Zollicoffer, next to destroy his force before it made it back to his border stronghold, then to follow up with an advance into Tennessee.  To accomplish this he would need to fill out his battalion into a full division, and he had already put in his requests to Sherman for more troops—and all the munitions and supplies his volunteers needed but were still stalled by incomprehensible delays.

Considering that his untested brigade (none of his regiments had seen battle) was going up against one that had already won several fights, Thomas’s plan was ambitious and risky.  It was sound nevertheless, and helped by the fact that Zollicoffer did not expect him. If only the weather had cooperated!  The heavy rains of the preceding week had turned the dirt road up the mountain into a slippery muck.  The more men who passed, the worse it got.  Wagons and cannons sunk to their axles.  If Schoepf could not get to Camp Wildcat before Zollicoffer it would make things very difficult, especially if the Rebels could drive out Col. Garrard first and establish their own stronghold to resist Schoepf’s attack when it finally arrived.  On the 20th the Rebel force passed through London and it seemed that they would reach Wildcat before it could be reinforced.  It was doubtful that Garrard could hold for long, and therefore critical that Schoepf get his boys there on time.  The men knew how desperate was the situation, and accepted being awakened at 3 a.m. Sunday to continue on a forced march. 

Stephen Keyes Fletcher, an enlisted man of the 33rd Indiana, serving on Col. Coburn’s staff, gives a first person view of what it was like to march out with Schoepf that day.4

[The Regiment] was ready to start at sun up, & most splendidly did he show forth that beautiful Sabbath morning as our boys wound around the foot of the large hill near this town.  Their bayonets all sparkling in the sun.  It was a stirring sight to me at least.  We trudged over the hills & through the muc at a forced march.  About noon I came up to Rock Castle river.  Here was quite an exciting scene.  The Regt. Had most all crossed, a boat load had just started across as I arrived on the bank.  The large elm tree trees with their wide spreading branches made almost a perfect arch over the river. Col Coburn stood at the landing on his horse, cheering the boys on. The crossing of the boys & the anticipation of a fight 3 miles ahead, filled me with an exciting feeling, & I took off my cap & gave one loud yell. [sic]

         Artist’s depiction of Schoepf’s artillery struggling up Wilderness Road

Anxious but not unnerved by the Rebel encroachment, Garrard did his best to delay Zollicoffer by cutting down trees to block the south road.  The delaying tactic worked and bought him a day.  While Rebel troops spent their Sunday clearing roads, Garrard sent out Wolford’s cavalry to do reconnaissance and to harass the Rebels.

After crossing the Rock Castle River the Indiana column reformed and distributed ammunition, and then began the final, most difficult stretch of their uphill march.  Soon they began meeting “wagon load after wagon load of sick soldiers from [Garrard’s regiment],” all telling of the skirmishing of pickets.  Stephen Fletcher tells how the column made way for a troop of home guards on horseback who “passed us going full tilt.”

Everyone yelled out as they passed, give em hell boys, give em hell. They responded, yes, we’ll give em hell. But before we got to Wild Cat we met them all coming back on a slow trot saying that the pickets had quit fighting, & they were not needed.  They were realy the bigest set of cowards I ever saw. [sic]

Schoepf made it to Camp Wildcat shortly after noon with the vanguard of his first column, and the rest continued throughout the day to slowly fill the camp as they struggled up the north side of the mountain.  There were skirmishes and firefights between the opposing cavalry units that afternoon and evening, but Zollicoffer’s attack would have to wait for the next morning.  By nightfall the numerical odds had drawn almost even.  Zollicoffer’s men had faced fire while Schoepf’s were green, but the latter had the advantage of an excellent defensive position.

Meanwhile early Sunday morning the 1st and 2nd Tennessee, followed by the 38th Ohio, had finally begun the southward ascent toward Wildcat along mountain roads that were scarcely worth the name, and that were already torn up by the passing of the Indiana and Ohio regiments.  (It is not a simple thing to move thousands of men along a narrow mud road through forest and mountain.)  On the way they found out that having an easy camp life is not necessarily a good thing for a soldier.  Jack Snow observes:

The men were fat and tired quickly, so the march turned out to be anything but a picnic even though the weather was cool.  They were equipped with a Harper’s Ferry musket, ammunition, two blankets, an extra suit of clothes, eating utensils, etc., packed into a haversack.  “They were supposed to weigh about 40 pounds,” Mr. Snow reminisced, “but many of the boys gathered up things they wanted to keep.  They would start with a heavy load and, as they became tired or if they got in a skirmish, they would throw their extras away.”3

***

On Monday morning the 21st, under Schoepf’s orders, Col. John Colburn assumed command from Garrard and began placing his troops.  He assigned half of his 33rd Indiana to the steep southern rise that was most likely to be attacked first. From them it took its name: Hoosier Knob.  It was none too soon.

In the pre-dawn darkness Rebel troops of the 17th and 29th Tennessee Infantry were already working their way up toward that knob on the southeast end of the ridge.  Sgt. Fletcher of the 33rd Indiana describes the early morning alarm:

About 7 A.M. Monday 21 while I was eating breakfast with Col [Coburn] … Gen Sheoppf rode up & Staff, told Col Coburn to get his men in line immediately, that the enemy were right on us.  All was now astir & excitement. The long roll beat & in less than 10 minutes the Regt was formed & all read for the word.  4 of our companies were sent over west to build breast works & guard a pass where we expected the enemy to try to flank us. The other 4 companies (there being two left at Crab Orchard) went East on the hill where the fight took place.  I went with this party.  Went up double quick, 3/4/ of a mile.  The men were immediately deployed around the hill & down through the gullies.  But before this was completed we were fired upon. [sic]



Zollicoffer divided his brigade into two battle groups, one to attack Hoosier Knob, the other Infantry Ridge.  The battle began with scattered fire like a skirmish, with soldiers firing at will and not with coordinated volleys.  Unlike a typical skirmish the firefight continued for over an hour before there was a recession in the firing while troops on both sides replenished their ammunition.  The first Union casualty of the battle occurred about ten minutes after the shooting commenced.  Says Fletcher:

One of our men … by the name of McFerrin was shot in the left chest…. He walked up the hill to where we were [and] said, “Capt[ain,] I’m shot.  I’m a dead man.’  He carried his gun up with him.  H[e] died in about 5 minutes.

Zollicoffer’s first assault, coming in successive waves, was finally repelled.  At mid-day the Confederate general rested his men, reorganized his regiments, and brought up his artillery to pound the fortifications.   About 2 p.m. he was ready to try again to break Schoepf’s hold.  By now, however, the rest of Schoepf’s main force had arrived and he had his own battery in place that immediately returned fire.  The artillery duel did not last long after that.  At this point the numerical match was almost even, and though the fighting was fierce—the Rebels charging up the hill “to within 30 steps of our men with their hats on their bayonets”—the Hoosiers and Ohioans repelled the Rebels again.

While the battle raged, the Tennesseans in Schoepf’s second column were still toiling along the narrow Wilderness Road and its side roads.  They had marched all day Sunday, slept on the roadside, and were up early Monday.  They heard the gunfire from Wildcat as they marched and it helped them keep their focus. When the 2nd Tennessee finally reached the battlefield late that afternoon, Zollicoffer’s second assault had mostly played out, though the parting shots were still being fired after dusk.  The final Rebel “attack” was an artillery round fired around midnight.  To the disappointment of some, most of the Tennesseans never got off a shot of their own.  The blue-uniformed Hoosiers would get the major share of honor from this victory, while the irregular-looking, jeans-clad Tennesseans had to wait for the next day before they would have their crack at Old Zolly.

The Union troops spent the better part of the night repairing the battle-damaged fortifications, anticipating a fresh assault in the morning, and wondering if their own commander was contemplating a counter-attack.  They didn’t get much rest.  In the dark woods before them they could hear the cadence of drums beating out instructions, the rattle of wagon wheels, the bawling complaints of mules, and the tramping of feet.  They were told to expect an attack at first light, and there was tightness in many stomachs.

The light of dawn and morning reconnaissance revealed an empty valley below. The sounds they had heard all night were not of preparations for combat, but of evacuation.  Zollicoffer had withdrawn and headed back to his base at Cumberland Ford.  He wrote in his report to Johnston, "Having reconnoitered in force under heavy fire for several hours from heights on the right, left, and front, I became satisfied that it could not be carried otherwise than by immense exposure... I deemed it proper the next day to fall back."  Thus he represented the expedition to Wildcat as a reconnaissance in force, not an assault.  Thus to him it was not a battle he lost, but a probing action he declined to pursue.

It is true he did not suffer excessive casualties—11 killed, 42 wounded, plus the 7 killed at Barbourville.  The combat effectiveness of his brigade was scarcely impeded at all, but Zollicoffer had no desire to spend his manpower in vain charges on a strong position.

Zollicoffer’s decision to pull back was correct, and Albert Sidney Johnston agreed.  His men did not see it that way, however.  The same men who had affectionately called him “Pappy Zolly” before were now calling him “Granny Zolly,” and the fight at Wildcat they called “Zolly’s Folly.”  Zollicoffer himself seemed somewhat demoralized, and remained inactive for a good month, distracted also by fifth column activities back in Tennessee.

On the other side, Schoepf’s men—Thomas’s men—had shown their mettle.  They were well organized, well commanded, and eager to prove themselves.  They would not be scattered like the Home Guard.  Confederate casualties were light, but Union casualties were even lighter: 5 killed, 20 wounded.  The low numbers of those killed and wounded, in light of the horrific casualties seen in so many Civil War battles, can be attributed to a couple of factors.  The heavily wooded environment absorbed much of the firepower of both sides, and much of that firepower consisted of smoothbore muskets, not rifles firing the dreaded, deadly minié ball.

While Zollicoffer minimized the estimation of his defeat, the U. S. Army and the Northern press maximized the importance of Schoepf’s win—and exaggerated its size.  The Boston Courier reported a thousand Confederate casualties.  It was, to be sure, the first calculable Union victory in the Western theater (indeed, practically the first good military news for the North since the Bull Run debacle), and the first test of volunteer troops in the West.  General Thomas quickly arrived at Camp Wildcat for a tour of the battlefield and a complete briefing.  He was pleased with the way his men measured up to a tough first assignment: a forced march to a hot combat zone, facing confident veterans, and turning back a determined attack. Though Schoepf was unable to destroy, or even damage Zollicoffer, he stopped him effectively.

The men of the 2nd Tennessee felt a mixture of pride to be part of a successful operation, disappointment that they missed their baptism of fire seemingly by minutes, and relief that none of them got hurt.  Their view of the battlefield sobered them, for though it was not as bad as it could be or as they would see in the future, it was more terrible and bloody than anything they had seen before.  To them it seemed as though hundreds had been killed, and they could see bloody trails where the dead had been dragged and the wounded had crawled away. Jack Snow vividly remembered the sight 74 years later. “I didn’t like it, seeing fellows lying there with their heads shot off, brains scattered all around.  It was a terrible sight.”  They would see far worse, but none that measured up to the shock of the first time.

As Zollicoffer retreated to his stronghold at Cumberland Ford, Thomas ordered Schoepf to pursue as far as London and hold there to wait for supplies and reinforcements.  The Tennessee troops were certain that they would soon receive orders to push Zollicoffer back through the Cumberland Gap and liberate East Tennessee.  Morale was high, for finally they would get to do what they had left their homes to do.

NOTES

  1. 1. Maps and drawings of the Battle of Camp Wildcat are from the USDA Forest Service website, “Daniel Boone National Forest: Camp Wildcat on London Ranger District,” http://www.fs.fed.us/r8/boone/districts/london/wildcat.shtml.

  2. 2. Addison Hart, “That Dark and Bloody Ground: The Kentucky Campaign of 1861,” at www.civilwarhome.com

  3. 3. All references to “Jack Snow” are from “Adventures of Jack Snow” [transcribed from Civil War Centennial 1861-1961].

  4. 4. All references herein to Stephen Keyes Fletcher are from, “Civil War Journal of Stephen Keyes Fletcher” in Indiana Magazine of History at http://www.indiana.edu~imhfiles/Civil_War_VFP/SFletcher_Journal.pdf.

***

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