Before discussing the proposed national primary, it is important to point out the flaws in the curent nominaion system. The many flaws I address will show why we need a change to something better.
| A Bad Beginning: |
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This is especially bad for American democracy because Iowa and New Hampshire are unrepresentative of the nation as a whole. As the Economist reported (2000, pg. 30), "they are among the least typical states, being 98% white and , in Iowa's case, largely tied to farming." Being a "farm state", Iowa is known to be heavily rural, but so is New Hampshire. "New Hampshire is one of the least urban states in the nation" and "perhaps the toughest in the nation to get interest in 'big city issues'" (Nichols, 1996, pg. 30). As Nichols (1996, pg. 30) points out, New Hampshire is much more conservative than much of the United States, exclaiming "imagine a whole state where (angry white males) define the political discourse." After those two states, representing less than two percent of the population, have their nominating elections, some candidates already drop out. It does not matter how the rest of the nation feels about those candidates. But those states love their power and any candidate that opposes it does not have much of a Presidential future. The Economist (2004, pg. 23) reported on Democratic candidate Howard Dean, who was ahead in Iowa polls for awhile, but fell to third in the last week or two: "...one of the things that slowed Mr Dean's momentum in Iowa was his honesty about this circus." In an old TV interview unearthed, Dean said "Iowa's caucuses were dominated by special interests, extremists, and windbags." (2004, pg. 23)
| Frontloading: |
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frontloading has secondary effects. Atkeson and Maestas (2009, pg. 62) point out that "frontloading often leads to separation of the presidential nomination contest from other nomination contests in the state," which decreases voter turnout later on when those state/local contests are held.
States may have a financial incentive to move their primaries and caucuses up. A study by Mixon Jr. and Hobson (2001, pg. 29-37) showed that after states moved their primaries forward, they received more federal grants. Their study showed "the average state would receive an additional $362 million to $1.2 billion (over a two year period)" by holding earlier primaries. But private money is just as important. The Christian Science Monitor (2003, pg. 2) reportes that primary season brings in $300 million to New Hampshire's economy.
And speaking of money, "frontloading increases the amount of early fundraising required and thereby limits the number of candidates who are able to mount a credible, competitive campaign" (Mayer, 2009, pg. 65).
Critics of the state by state primary season of the past used to contend it made both potential candidates and voters disinterested due to the long campaigning. But frontloading seems to have lead to longer and earlier campaigns. Simon (2002, pg. 16) reportes most of the future candidates were stumping in New Hampshire two years before campaigning traditionally starts. As he says: "it is almost impossible to tell in the modern era exactly when a campaign begins, because campaigning is now endless" (2002. pg. 16). It has only gotten worse. The first Presidential candidates debate for 2008 was in April, 2007, and as Mayer (2009, pg. 65) pointed out, "we narrowly avoided holding the Iowa caucuses in 2007." If all the other states think that longer campaign will mean more candidate time in thier states, they are mistaken. Candidates just spend more time in Iowa and New Hampshire (see for example, Broder, 2008, pg. 6).
| The Order of State Votes: |
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Haskel (1996, pg. 105) believes, "it is conceivable that rearranging the order of the states' primaries could alter the outcome of a particular campaign". Most likely, if a candidate were from a large state that voted, say, at the end of February, he or she would probably have a lot more delegates going into March than if that state did not vote until June. Paul (1997, pg. 224) reports that both California and New York moved their primaries earlier with the intention of being the ones considered responsible for getting a candidate nominated "and that this would lead candidates to make commitments to advance that state's interests." The worst example of states voting in a group was, for several elections, "Super Tuesday", where mainly conservative Southern states voted on the same day. In the 2004 elections more states finally moved their primaries and caucuses up to or before Super Tuesday to gain more influence. Some Southern States then broke away as well and moved theirs up earlier. Were these new results fair to the Southern states? Were the results of past Super Tuesdays fair to everyone else?
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| The Delegate System: |
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To begin, when a candidate with delegates drops out of the race, his/her votes are up for grabs at the party's convention in June. Those who voted for that candidate are now shut out of the process. The caucus system chooses delegates not by secret ballot, but in various meeting places around the state holding the caucus where people publicly vote for their nominee of choice. It is not surprising that "caucus participation, which rarely exceeds 5-10 percent, is generally limited to local activists and party leaders" and "certain elite groups" (Gurian, 1993, pg. 312). Those who are less involved with politics or who may favor a candidate with policies that are opposed by the majority in their state (or even their district) must feel intimidated about publicly declaring their choice. Indeed, a study from the University of Iowa (2008, pg. 129-138) showed different poll ranges for candidates leading up to the caucus from likely caucus attendees vs registered voters in general, both in the overall population and in many individual demographics. Most, if not all of these problems also apply to all other caucuses of course. Several states have "winner take all" elections (mainly for Republican candidates) with 100% of the delegates going to only the winner of that state. Republican nominating elections also may be "winner-take-most rules, and modified winner-take-all-rules" (Steger, 2000, pg. 730). Thus in those states, people who did not vote for the candidate who received 50% +1 vote end up having no say in who their party's nominee should be. Still others have a "preferential primary--popularly called the 'beauty contest'" (Davis, 1997, pg. 15). In such a contest voters vote for a "preference for president on the primary ballot, in addition to the selection of a slate of delegates," and this preference "may or may not be binding on the delegates selected" (Davis, 1997, pg. 271).
These different styles of alotting delegates can effect the outcome of the race. Lengle and Shafer (1976, pg. 25-30) called the different primary rules "the invisible participant" and showed for example how the Democratic outcome for the 1972 nomination would have had three different possible outcomes (between George Wallace, Hubert Humphrey and the winner, George McGovern) under a winner-take-all, a proportional, and a district delegate selection. Each State also has a number of "super delegates" who are the Congressperson's from the state along with un-elected party officials, who can vote for who they wish at the convention. Steger (2000, pg. 738) suggests these delegates may have changed the outcome of the 1984 Democratic nomination in favor of Walter Mondale instead of Gary Hart. Again this is regardless of how their Congressional district or state actually voted. Crain (2008, pg. 8) sarcastically observed that the parties do not "completely trust the popular vote and so had a super delegate hanging around just in case they might have to change the popular vote totals."
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| 2008 Democratic Primary, Florida and Michigan: |
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