INTERMISSION
During this break, I'll pass some other items your way.  Lets start with some random thoughts.


AVCO LYCOMING'S MASTERPIECE
Avco Lycoming AL5512

The 4435 horsepower Avco Lycoming AL5512 is a commercial variant of the T55-L712 Boeing Chinook helicopter engine.  This powerful engine only weighs 830 lbs.  It powers Columbia Helicopters' Boeing 234 heavy lift helicopters capable of 26,000 lb lifts.  Columbia bought the entire world fleet of 234's, a total of 10 helicopters.  They were my main customer as a tech rep for this engine model.  This masterpiece of engineering from 1955 was the brainchild of Germany's Third Reich turbine engine scientist Dr. Anselm FranzDr. Franz developed the famed Junkers Jumo 004 turbojet engine for the Messersmitt ME262 jet of WWII.  He created the Gas Turbine Division of Lycoming where I worked for 9 years.  He retired in 1968 as a vice president of Avco Lycoming and consulted for them up to about the time I started working for them.  Dr. Franz  developed the AGT1500 gas turbine tank engine for the M1 Abrams Tank, our main battle tank today. He was considered the "Werner Von Braun" of the gas turbine engine.  In the 1930's Dr Franz developed hydraulic torque converter technology and much of the turbocharger technology used in this day and age.

DISTRACTIONS
Screwups by technicians aren't the only ones that are costly.  Administrative errors can be costly too.  Many of those are a little more "revokeable" than the assembly error a tech can make, hence, they aren't usually subject to an "investigation" except in the case of Boeing and other forward looking companies who've chosen to do so.  More on these other areas later.

As techs, we need to maintain focus.  In the smaller branches and businesses where only two or three techs are working, sometimes one has to assume a role of leadership because perhaps he is a "go to" guy.  That person has to deal with unrelenting distractions and yet keep from forgetting a key task in the piece of hardware he is dealing with at the time.  Distraction leads to forgetting.  Some are better at coping with distraction than others.  I can usually cope with it but my repair times can suffer. 

ASE (Automotive Service Excellence) determined in a study that if a tech is interrupted by a simple question requiring an answer, the minimum time penalty to the repair time is 12 minutes.  Figure that times 10 or 12 and you'll see what it can do to standard repair times. 
I'm still trying to relocate that study but haven't so far.  If I find it, I'll post it on this page.


ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPERVISIONAL ERROR TOLERANCE THRESHOLDS
As offensive as it might be to administrative staff, bear with me here.   I've often made the cold remark that "If we on the shop floor made as many uncaptured errors as the front office, we would only have lasted several weeks in this trade." 
It's not that simple of course.  But on the shop floor, tolerance of human performance errors is low, and in the office it is to a certain degree a little higher.  It's just a different set of tasks with different risk levels.  Many of the mistakes made in administration such as parts that don't get ordered and phone calls that don't get placed can be smoothed over later without severe financial liability or reputation damage. 

The threshold of tolerance is different in the two environments because of the nature of the tasks at hand.  It's not a criticism, it's just a fact. 
Once a tech makes an uncaptured error on an assembly job and it leaves the shop that way, it cannot be revoked. 

Money is lost on comebacks and damages.  Reputations are damaged.  It can take many years to repair a bad reputation.  Customers speak of bad experiences for many years, sometimes a decade.  They may rarely speak of a routine or successful experience with a tech or repair agency.

If the error is recognised before it leaves the shop, the hardware can be disassembled, error corrected and it can leave the shop assembled correctly.  That is a captured error.  Error capturing also uses a strategy of having a system in place to render the error as harmless as is possible.  An example in my case would be that I always carry two small high intensity flashlights and two utility tools on my person.  If I leave one on a bench or tool box, I still have one on me if I'm under a vehicle working.   I have at least two of many things for the same reason.  I don't have to go looking for a misplaced tool immediately when I need it.  I have a second copy in the tool's proper place.  That is an error capture strategy. 

Error capturing is an interesting subject.   You can get good at it. 


ERROR CAPTURING AND RESILIENCE ENGINEERING
Error Capturing is a strategy put in place to render an error harmless or corrected before it harms.  A spell checker in a word processor would be a good example.  Resilience Engineering is a relatively new field whereby the trait of "resilience" is defined and engineered into a system or workplace to predict or foresee a harmful and unwanted outcome.

Researchers in Systems Resilience Engineering recently identified the need to:
- Get smarter at reporting the next adverse event
- Detect drift into failure before breakdown occurs. Large system accidents have revealed that what is considered to be normal is highly negotiable.There is no operational model of drift.
- Constantly test whether ideas about risk still match reality

So resilience is an anticipation strategy that hopes to predict unwanted outcomes.  As an example, the researchers said that operators with
a deep understanding of an application area are an important source of resilience and are examples of "expertise in action".  They allow two sources of resilience, that of knowing sooner when things are going to go wrong, and secondly having knowlege that allows them to develop adaptive resources "on the fly".  Good companies with brilliant people do this without thinking about it.

So since error capturing gets put in place to prevent an error from going unchecked, it a resilience strategy.

THE BOEING MEDA RESILIENCE STRATEGY AND TECHNICIAN ERRORS
A company that practices resilience wishes to predict unwanted outcomes.  Technician errors and administrative errors would be two areas ending in unwanted outcomes.  The forward looking company would use errors made by technicians to prevent future unwanted outcomes which increases their resilience level.

The AERO article mentioned is clear about when and when not to discipline a tech for an error resulting in an unwanted outcome.


DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Boeing's MEDA investigation process is very specific regarding punishment of technicians who've errored, but it also says there must be a discipline policy in place.  The referenced 2007 Boeing AERO article stated the following about punishment:

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The central philosophy of the MEDA process is that people do not make errors on purpose. While some errors do result from people engaging in behavior they know is risky, errors are often made in situations where the person is actually attempting to do the right thing. In fact, it is possible for others in the same situation to make the same mistake.

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In a typical event investigation, as conducted at many airlines in the past, a maintenance event occurs, it is determined that the event was caused by an error, the technician who did the work is found, and the technician is punished. Many times, no further action is taken. However, if the technician is punished but the contributing factors are not fixed, the probability that the same event will occur in the future is
unchanged. The MEDA process finds the contri­buting factors and identifies improvements to eliminate or minimize these contributing factors
in order to reduce the probability that the event will recur in the future.

- During a MEDA investigation, it is still neces­sary to determine whether the event is caused by human behavior and find the individual(s) involved.  Instead of being punished, however, the technician is interviewed to get a better understanding of the contributing factors and get the technician’s ideas for possible improvements. The information can then be added to a database.


It is important to have a discipline policy in place to deal with violation aspects of maintenance events. However, discipline or punishment is only effective for intentional acts. Boeing suggests a policy that:
- Does not punish honest errors.
- Does not punish routine violations.
- Considers punishment for situational violations.
- Provides punishment for exceptional violations.

The AERO 2007 document defines the specific violation types.

PAGE FOUR

The answer to what happened in the quadruple fatal airplane crash from the first page will be on page four.

Back to TM page one